RPKI adoption and the remaining limits of route origin validation

I use Pi-hole and uBound to add layers of protection to my home network and browsing environment, mainly by filtering DNS requests and blocking unwanted content before it reaches us. Working with these tools has reinforced my interest in how security controls operate at different layers of the network stack, particularly where their effectiveness depends on infrastructure beyond mine. Internet routing is one such layer, and recent RPKI adoption figures provide an interesting perspective on its security.

This article reports a y2y increase in RPKI-valid routed prefixes, from 54% to 70%. The median number of collector vantage points observing invalid prefixes was just two, compared with 596 for valid prefixes, a difference consistent with the role of route origin validation in limiting the propagation of unauthorized announcements. However, RPKI only verifies whether an autonomous system is authorized to originate a prefix; it does not validate the entire AS path, and permissive ROA maxLength settings can still introduce exposure.

The distinction matters because security controls address different failure modes. Pi-hole and uBound help reduce exposure at the DNS and navigation layers, while RPKI addresses route origin authorization at the interdomain routing layer. As a hobbyist, I can configure and maintain the former within my own network, but the latter depends on decisions made by network operators and ISPs. It is a reminder of how much of my network’s security remains outside my direct control.

https://ipinfo.io/blog/rpki-protects-70-internet-routes

The Cuckoo’s Egg

I just finished “The Cuckoo’s Egg” by Clifford Stoll. This true story is from the 80’s and reading it as Gen Xer gave it an entirely different weight. Stoll’s obsessive tracking of a hacker through a maze of dial-up connections and computer networks brought back a flood of memories from my own teenage years, when I spent countless evenings dialing into BBS systems and waiting for that familiar screech of a modem handshake to connect me to a small, text-based corner of the world.

Because I belong to that first generation that experienced the early online world firsthand in its earliest, clunkiest, most improvised form, the technical descriptions in the book never feel like historical curiosities to me the way they might to younger readers. The idea of tracing a security breach across a patchwork of telephone exchanges and rented lines, of treating bandwidth and connection time as genuinely scarce resources worth fighting for, mirrors exactly what it felt like to be online during that era, when connection time and computing resources often carried a very tangible cost and every connection was a small negotiation with the physical infrastructure underneath it.

What makes the book more than just a nostalgia trip for people like me is how well it captures the tension between the physical world of telephone lines, modems, and telecommunications infrastructure and the emerging digital world that would eventually swallow it whole. Stoll wrote a technical thriller that also happens to be a time capsule of a specific and fleeting moment in computing history, and having lived through even a small piece of that moment makes his obsessive hunt for a hacker feel less like fiction and more like a shared memory.

If you came of age anywhere near computers and modems during that decade, I think this book will hit you the same way it hit me, somewhere between recognition and disbelief that we ever tolerated systems that slow and still found them thrilling.

What happened after 2,000 people tried to hack my AI assistant

The developer Fernando Irarrázaval ran a public experiment where anyone could email his AI assistant and try to make it leak the contents of a secrets file, and the results clarify where prompt injection stands today. Over the course of the experiment the assistant received more than six thousand emails from over two thousand people, and not one of them succeeded in extracting the secret or triggering an unauthorized reply.The defensive setup was minimal; the system prompt contained only a few lines instructing the model never to reveal credentials, never to modify its own files, and never to execute code received over email.

The attacks covered the range of social engineering you would expect, including authority impersonation, fabricated incident response requests, fake compliance audits, and the same message rewritten across several languages to probe for weaker instruction-following outside English. And his defenses were effective to the point of non-exploitation.

I’ll push back a little. Given how consistently security researchers flag prompt injection as a real, unresolved risk for agentic systems, I don’t think one experiment, even if well-run and designed, should move anyone toward optimism. It shows a hardened model resisted attacks over email. It doesn’t show the problem is smaller than experts think.

https://www.fernandoi.cl/posts/hackmyclaw/